Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …

Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If … the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the … performance of both products. We show that if the probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the …

This paper analyzes optimal product lines when consumers differ both in their taste for quality and in their desire for … valuations for quality but by image concerns. A typical monopoly outcome is a two-tier product line resembling a "masstige …" strategy as observed in luxury goods markets. Products can have identical quality and differ only in price and image, thereby …

markets, some buyers do not know the quality of the good, but learn about it from observing prices. Under noisy demand, third …

analyze whether signaling works in the German market for insurance intermediation services. For this a signal must increase … service quality and be easily identifiable by consumers so that it pays for intermediaries to spend the related costs. By … using OLS and logit estimations we test whether intermediary type, reputational activities and a variety of signaling …

' intrinsic signaling incentives and positive feedback effects. Anticipating this, the seller commits to provide price discounts …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …

monopoly problem when the price imperfectly signals quality to the uninformed buyers. We then study the effect of noise on …

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer …

quality signal perfectly identifies unsafe goods by giving sellers incentives to disclose type without audits. Introducing a …