We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter...

This study tests experimentally whether teams can create synergies in strategic interactions. For our comparison between team and individual behavior we employ the race game. This game has the advantage that the optimal strategy does neither depend on beliefs about other players nor on...

The dynamics of behavior observed in standard public-good experiments can be explained by imperfect conditional cooperation combined with social learning (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). But it is unclear what determines first-round contributions. We argue that first-round contributions depend...

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price-based and buyer-determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price-based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer-determined auctions. Only in the latter...

Since Mancur Olson's "Logic of collective action" it is common conviction in social sciences that in large groups the prospects of a successful organization of collective actions are rather bad. Following Olson's logic, the impact of an individual's costly contribution becomes smaller if the...