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Campaign Cost and Electoral Accountability

Prato, Carlo - 2018

paramount importance in modern democracies. We propose a theory of electoral accountability where candidates choose whether to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938658

Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation : a first pass

Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - 2010

We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may differ in … competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician's policy proposals are attractive to … and Coate (1998). Political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities. Nevertheless, the two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008806541

Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2010

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965090

Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2009

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379359

Electoral Competition with Third Party Entry in the Lab

Tsakas, Nikolas - 2017

Electoral competition between two vote-share maximizing candidates in the context of the unidimensional spatial model leads to platform convergence: both candidates end up proposing the ideal policy of the median voter. Palfrey (1984) famously argued that if third candidate entry is expected...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012943459

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Van Winden, F. A. A. M. - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316216

Voting Blocs, Party Discipline and Party Formation

Eguia, Jon X. - 2010

In this paper I study the strategic implications of coalition formation in an assembly. A coalition forms a voting bloc to coordinate the voting behavior of its members, acting as a single player and affecting the policy outcome. In a game of endogenous coalition formation, I show that voting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200421

Party Discipline and Pork-Barrel Politics

Grossman, Gene M.; Helpman, Elhanan - 2010

Polities differ in the extent to which political parties can pre-commit to carry out promised policy actions if they take power. Commitment problems may arise due to a divergence between the ex ante incentives facing national parties that seek to capture control of the legislature and the ex...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014063934

Pandering and Electoral Competition

Gratton, Gabriele - 2013

We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041206

Generalized Medians and Electoral Competition with Valence

Kalandrakis, Tasos - 2022

I establish conditions for existence of pure strategy equilibria in K-candidate Downsian electoral competition (K ≥ 2) with valence when the voting rule is monotonic, generalizing results by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) and Martin et al. (2021). The conditions are sufficient when K ≥ 2 and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013294056