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Group robust stability in matching markets
Afacan, Mustafa Ogǔz - 2010
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008663538
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Group robust stability in matching markets
Afacan, Mustafa Oğuz - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 394-398
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511658
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Robust stability in matching markets
Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986
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Group Robust Stability in Matching Markets
Afacan, Mustafa Oguz - 2011
misreporting preferences and then rematching, by any group of students in the school choice type of matching markets. Our first … the acceptance of an appeal of a student to rematch after the announced matching. In this setting, we show that under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126291
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina; Dianat, Ahrash; Samuelson, Larry; … - 2021
We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415563
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How to get truthful reporting in matching markets : a field experiment
Guillén, Pablo; Hakimov, Rustamdjan - 2015
the matching mechanism. In the second they received a description of the strategy-proofness of the mechanism without … effect of describing the strategy-proofness on truth-telling rates. On the other hand, describing the matching mechanism has …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389373
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School choice and loss aversion
Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2021
Evidence suggests that participants in direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanisms (DA) play dominated strategies. To explain the data, we introduce expectation-based loss aversion into a school-choice setting and characterize choice-acclimating personal equilibria in DA. We find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012698801
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Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness
Meisner, Vincent - 2021
Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382
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Economic engineering and the design of matching markets : the contributions of Alvin E. Roth
Jackson, Matthew O. - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 115 (2013) 3, pp. 619-639
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778347
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Are affirmative action policies so impossible?
Combe, Julien - In: Revue d'économie politique 128 (2018) 6, pp. 1123-1173
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012267213