Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Year of publication: |
January 2021
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Authors: | Agranov, Marina ; Dianat, Ahrash ; Samuelson, Larry ; Yariv, Leeat |
Publisher: |
Munich, Germany : CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute |
Subject: | matching | incomplete information | stability | experiments | Theorie | Theory | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Matching | Marktmechanismus | Market mechanism | Stabilität eines Gleichgewichts | Stability of equilibrium |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten) Illustrationen |
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Series: | CESifo working papers. - München : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 2364-1428, ZDB-ID 2065232-X. - Vol. no. 8820 (2021) |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | hdl:10419/232417 [Handle] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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Paying to match : decentralized markets with information frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
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Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...
-
Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
-
Paying to Match : Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions
Agranov, Marina, (2021)
- More ...