We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....

We consider a model of stochastic evolution under general noisy best response protocols, allowing the probabilities of suboptimal choices to depend on their payoff consequences. Our analysis focuses on behavior in the small noise double limit: we first take the noise level in agents' decisions...

We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...

We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the Centipede game, these best experienced...

Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols....