Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

Josef Hofbauer and William H. Sandholm

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics. Numerical analysis reveals that dominated strategies can persist at nontrivial frequencies even when the level of domination is not small.

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Year of publication:	September 2011
Authors:	Hofbauer, Josef ; Sandholm, William H.
Published in:	Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 6.2011, 3, p. 341-377
Subject:	Evolutionary game theory \| evolutionary game dynamics \| nonconvergnece \| dominated strategies \| Evolutionäre Spieltheorie \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Evolutionsökonomik \| Evolutionary economics

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3982/TE771 [DOI] hdl:10419/150158 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691158