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Multidimensional screening with complementary activities : regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010240853
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Regulating a manager whose empire-building preferences are private information
Borges, Ana Pinto; Correira-da-Silva, João; Laussel, Didier - In: Journal of economics 111 (2014) 2, pp. 105-130
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252769
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The Optimal Provision of Curative Goods
BORGES, ANA PINTO; HENRIET, DOMINIQUE; LAUSSEL, DIDIER - In: Journal of Public Economic Theory 13 (2011) 4, pp. 481-502
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009210568
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Multidimensional screening with complementary activities: Regulating a monopolist with unknown cost and unknown preference for empire building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369417
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Regulating a monopolist with unknown bureaucratic tendencies
Borges, Ana Pinto; Correia-da-Silva, João; Laussel, Didier - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto - 2009
We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in the case in which the bureaucratic bias is firm's private information. We find that output is distorted upward when the bureaucratic bias is low, downward when it is high, and equals a reference output when it is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008476410
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Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building
Borges, Ana Pinto; Laussel, Didier; Correia-da-Silva, João - In: Games 4 (2013) 3, pp. 532-560
We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency (marginal utility of output) are private information, but actual cost (the difference between intrinsic cost and effort level) is observable. This is a problem of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030510
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COVID crisis and the impact on smart tourism, sustainable development and local communities
Rodrigues, Paula Cristina Lopes; Gómez-Suárez, Mónica; … - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012888396
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Social networks in the non-profit sector : social support practices
Oliveira, Márcio José Sol Pereira; Oliveira, José; … - In: International review on public and non-profit marketing 18 (2021) 4, pp. 523-552
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012703835
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Consumer decision making from a beloved brand : the Aspirin case
Borges, Ana Pinto; Rodrigues, Paula Cristina Lopes - In: New techniques for brand management in the healthcare sector, (pp. 184-198). 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012516044
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New luxury vs. old luxury : what is the definition of luxury brand?
Rodrigues, Paula Cristina Lopes; Borges, Ana Pinto - In: Building consumer-brand relationship in luxury brand …, (pp. 45-64). 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012517936