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Communication and trust in principal-team relationships : experimental evidence
Kleine, Marco; Kube, Sebastian - 2015
-assessments can be detrimental to workers' performance. In the controlled environment of a laboratory gift-exchange experiment, our …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010467800
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Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie - 2011
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors … supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121746
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Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment
Rosaz, Julie; Villeval, Marie Claire - 2011
This paper presents the results of a laboratory experiment in which workers perform a real-effort task and supervisors … supervisor and the worker. We find that not all the supervisors, but at least one third of them bias their report. Both selfish …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176642
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Supervisor negative feedback and employee motivation to learn : an attribution perspective
Xing, Lu; Sun, Jian-Min; Jepsen, Denise; Zhang, Yejun - In: Human relations : towards the integration of the social … 76 (2023) 2, pp. 310-340
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014246675
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Leniency bias in long-term workplace relationships
Tichem, Jan - 2013
altruism sometimes provides a net incentive to report performance truthfully, rather than to bias evaluations upward. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226565
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How unjust! : an experimental investigation of supervisors' evaluation errors and agents' incentives
Marchegiani, Lucia; Reggiani, Tommaso; Rizzolli, Matteo - 2011
predicts both errors to be equally detrimental to performance, this prediction fails with a lab experiment. In fact, failing to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009524335
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First-place loving and last-place loathing : how rank in the distribution of performance affects effort provision
Gill, David; Kissová, Zdenka; Lee, Jaesun; Prowse, … - 2015
receive feedback about their rank. Using a real-effort experiment, we aim to discover whether workers respond to the specific …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011308986
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What renders financial advisors less treacherous? : on commissions and reciprocity
Angelova, Vera - 2010
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980494
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What renders financial advisors less treacherous? : on commissions and reciprocity
Angelova, Vera - 2016
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not, will a voluntary or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530061
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2016
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurance) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011530065