Similar Search Results

Efficiency in a Search and Matching Model with Endogenous Participation

Albrecht, James; Navarro, Lucas; Vroman, Susan - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

We show that in a search/matching model with endogenous participation in which workers are heterogeneous with respect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822510

Efficiency in a Matching Model with Heterogeneous Agents: Too Many Good or Bad Jobs?

Blázquez, Maite; Jansen, Marcel - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2003

This paper analyses the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model with two types of workers and jobs … production technologies. Finally, in an extension we derive a tax scheme that restores efficiency and we show how workers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822529

Frictional Assignment, Part II: Infinite Horizon and Inequality

Shi, Shouyong - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2002

an infinite-horizon economy with matching frictions. I characterize first the efficient assignment and then the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005827214

Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

Albrecht, James; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan - Tinbergen Instituut - 2003

We analyse a model of equilibrium directed search in a large labour market. Each worker, observing the wages posted at all vacancies, makes a fixed, finite number of applications, a. We allow for the possibility of ex post competition should more than one vacancy want to hire the same worker....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249546

Matching with Quorums

Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus - 2012

We study the problem of allocating workers to different projects in which each project requires having a minimum number of workers assigned to it or else it does not open. We show that the well-known serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy-proof nor Pareto efficient. Thus, we propose...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158458

The Daycare Assignment Problem

Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus - 2011

Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm for dynamic problems and show that it yields a matching that satisfies strong … stability. It is not Pareto dominated by any other matching, and, if there is an efficient stable matching, it must be the Gale … stronger impossibility result: For the class of dynamic matching problems that we study, there are no algorithms that satisfy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024462

Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach

Hatfield, John William; Kojima, Fuhito; Narita, Yusuke - Becker Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, … - 2011

We study the effect of different school choice mechanisms on schools' incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school becomes more preferred by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009353445

On the Inefficiency of Matching Models of Unemployment with Heterogeneous Workers and Jobs when Firms Rank their Applicants

Gavrel, Frédéric - Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM) - 2011

In a circular matching model, firms rank their applicants and pick the best suited one. Job creation appears to lower …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293461

A theory of targeted search

Cheremukhin, Anton; Tutino, Antonella; … - Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas - 2014

resides in between the random matching and the directed search outcomes. The equilibrium that emerges from this middle ground … is inefficient relative to the constrained Pareto allocation. Our theory encompasses the outcomes of the random matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010772616

Matching with quorums

Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu - In: Economics Letters 120 (2013) 1, pp. 14-17

In the problem of allocating workers to different projects, where each project needs a minimum number of workers assigned to it, the serial dictatorship mechanism is neither strategy proof nor Pareto efficient. We therefore propose a strategy-proof and Pareto-efficient mechanism.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010665671