Donations to large numbers of victims are typically muted relative to donations to a single identified victim. This article shows that people can donate more to large numbers of victims if these victims are perceived as entitative—comprising a single, coherent unit. For example, donations to...

Consumers infer their best product choice from comparative information about themselves and products (Prelec, Wernerfelt, and Zettelmeyer). Though common, this "matching" process leads to unstable preferences when perceived product ranks change due to product array manipulations. This article...

We experimentally investigate people's evaluations of incentive pay contracts and people's predictions of others' evaluations of incentive pay contracts. We emphasize that the construction of evaluations and predictions often includes two substeps, involving likelihood judgment and likelihood...

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...

We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The...