The e-mail game in Rubinstein (1989) shows that types with arbitrarily close higher-order beliefs may differ substantially in strategic behaviors. We define a notion called strategic discontinuity in arbitrary incomplete-information scenarios to generalize this e-mail game phenomenon. We show...

Given the regularity condition on posteriors proposed in Lehrer and Samet (2011), we show that Lehrer and Sametʼs (2011) characterization of agreeing to agree in countable-information models cannot be extended to uncountable-information models. This answers an open question raised in Lehrer and...

Barelli [P. Barelli, On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design, J. Econ. Theory 144 (2009) 1320-1332] defines beliefs-determine-preferences (BDP) models and argues that BDP models are nongeneric in a topological sense. In this note, we point out some difficulties in...

This paper analyzes simultaneous ascending auctions of two different items, viewed as complements by multi-item bidders. The finding is that such auctions overly concentrate the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly diffuse them to single-item bidders. The main reason is that some...

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders’ types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller’s problem can be...

Applying auction theory to the toxic-asset rescue plan currently released by theUnited States Treasury Department, this paper demonstrates an equilibrium wheremoderately poor bidders outbid rich bidders in such auctions. After defeating theirrich rivals and acquiring the toxic assets, such...

The core is reformulated to incorporate the externality typical in strategic formgames. Any coalition of players may deviate by trying to commit to a profile of actionsdifferent from a status quo. The outsiders of the coalition may take a coordinatedmeasure, incentive-feasibly for themselves, to...

We characterize optimal selling mechanisms in auction environments where biddersmust incur a cost to learn their valuations. These mechanisms specify for eachperiod, as a function of the bids in previous periods, which new potential buyersshould be asked to bid. In addition, these mechanisms...

A model of English auction that allows jump bidding is proposed. When twoobjects are sold separately via such English auctions, I construct an equilibrium suchthat bidders signal via jump bids, thereby forming rational expectations of the priceswithout relying on any central mediator. This...