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Kollusion und Fusion in Contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
In vielen Gütermärkten erfolgt der Wettbewerb zwischen Unternehmen nicht primär über Preise und Mengen, sondern über … Verkaufsanstrengungen. Ein Beispiel hierfür ist der Kampf um Marktanteile und Kunden in Märkten mit hohen Werbeaufwendungen. Wenn … Unternehmen in solchen Märkten kooperieren, müssen sie entscheiden, ob sie ihre gesamte Produktpalette beibehalten und ihre …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307019
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Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: The role of internal organization, information, and market structure
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Unternehmensfusionen führen häufig zu komplexen Organisationen. Fusionen haben deshalb andere und tiefgründige … die fusionierenden Unternehmen und wohlfahrtserhöhend wirken kann, selbst dann, wenn es durch die Fusion keinerlei …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307515
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Merger in contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2000
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest structure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310200
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Divisionalization in contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2000
To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310208
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Profitable horizontal mergers: A market structure-oriented view
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2000
We propose a model in which mergers exert a more pronounced effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The results help to reconcile theory with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010310276
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Merger in Contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2000
Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315035
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Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, Information, and Market Structure
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315137
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The merger paradox and why aspiration levels let it fail in the laboratory
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland; … - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 117 (2007), pp. 1073-1095
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003492471
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Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages : the role of internal organization, information, and market structure
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2001
Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. We show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare-improving even if costs are linear. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398061
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Divisionalization in contests
Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland - 2000
To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. -- contests ; Divisionalization ; delegation
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009582389