We investigate the effects of competition on managerial incentives and effort in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers compensation to his manager in two different contexts: monopoly and Cournot duopoly. After accepting the compensation, the manager chooses an effort level to increase the...

The ambient tax is often considered as an efficient instrument to achieve a first best outcome of ambient pollution when the regulator cannot observe individual emissions, or when monitoring costs are prohibitive. While this view is supported to a large extent by experimental findings, there...

Ce papier survole la littérature théorique et empirique de l’effet de la concurrence sur les schémas de rémunération et sur l’effort du dirigeant. Les études théoriques montrent que la concurrence affecte les incitations et l’effort du dirigeant par son effet sur la structure...

We investigate how increased competition affects firm owners׳ incentives and managers׳ efforts in a laboratory experiment. Each owner offers a compensation scheme to his manager in two different conditions: under monopoly and under Cournot duopoly. Following acceptance of the compensation, the...

Agents with ex-ante claims over a common pool resource (CPR) of uncertain size face the risk of resource shortage if the sum of the claims they have over the common pool resource is incompatible with the actual resource size. In case of shortage, a sharing rule or bankruptcy rule is required to...

We investigate experimentally whether higher trust leads to increased performance by relying on simple trust games. Our results show that trust and performance are positively related but not as strong as suggested in the investment game. As a side result, we observe that the rewards of the...

We investigate whether non-EU agents satisfy strategic dynamic consistency (SDC), i.e. "consistent planning" according to Strotz (1955). Depending on the dynamic axiom that is violated (dynamic consistency, consequentialism or reduction of compound lottery), we categorise non-EU individuals...

We report experimental data from a two-player, two-action unprofitable game with an unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Our design allows subjects to explicitly choose probability distributions over actions. Patterns of play differ greatly from the mixed strategy equilibrium and the maxmin...