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Learning in Networks—An Experimental Study Using Stationary Concepts
Berninghaus, Siegfried K.; Neumann, Thomas; Vogt, Bodo - In: Games 5 (2014) 3, pp. 140-159
Our study analyzes theories of learning for strategic interactions in networks. Participants played two of the 2 × 2 …, payoff-sampling equilibrium, and impulse balance equilibrium) which represent the long-run equilibrium of a learning process …. Secondly, we relate our results to four different learning models (impulse-matching learning, action-sampling learning, self …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011030494
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Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games
Newton, Jonathan - In: Journal of Economic Theory 147 (2012) 1, pp. 364-381
cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010582585
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Coalitional stochastic stability
Newton, Jonathan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 75 (2012) 2, pp. 842-854
benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010577245
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A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
Newton, Jonathan; Sawa, Ryoji - In: Journal of Economic Theory 157 (2015) C, pp. 1-27
This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011263593
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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - 2005
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312355
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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM) - 2005
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423090
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Social Games: Matching and the Play of Finitely Repeated Games
Jackson, Matthew O.; Watts, Alison - EconWPA - 2005
definitions, as well as the relationship to renegotiation-proof equilibrium. It is possible for repeated matching equilibria to be … completely distinct from renegotiation-proof equilibria, and even to be Pareto inefficient. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062336
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Beyond fictitious play beliefs: Incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
Spiliopoulos, Leonidas - In: Games and Economic Behavior 81 (2013) C, pp. 69-85
Belief models capable of detecting 2- to 5-period patterns in repeated games by matching the current historical context to similar realizations of past play are presented. The models are implemented in a cognitive framework, ACT-R, and vary in how they implement similarity-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049875
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When is Tit-For-Tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard - Economics Department, University of California-Davis - 2013
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010826387
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When is tit-for-tat unbeatable?
Duersch, Peter; Oechssler, Joerg; Schipper, Burkhard C. - 2013
We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class of simple imitation rules that includes tit-for-tat but...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318837