We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors' deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our...

Incompatibility in markets with indirect network effects can reduce consumers’ willingness to pay if they value “mix and match” combinations of complementary network components. For integrated firms selling complementary components, incompatibility should also strengthen the demand-side...

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors' deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our...

Incompatibility in market with network effects reduces consumers? ability to ?mix and match? components offered by different sellers, but can also spur changes in product attributes that might beneÞt consumers. In this paper, we estimate the effects of incompatibility on consumers in a classic...

Incompatibility in markets with indirect network expects can affect prices if consumers value mix and match combinations of complementary network components. In this paper, we exam- ine the effects of incompatibility using data from a classic market with indirect network effects: Automated...

We test whether firms use incompatibility strategically, using data from ATM markets. High ATM fees degrade the value of competitors’ deposit accounts, and can in principle serve as a mechanism for siphoning depositors away from competitors or for creating deposit account differentiation. Our...

We test whether a nonbinding price ceiling may serve as a focal point for tacit collusion, using data from the credit card market during the 1980's. Our empirical model can distinguish instances when firms match a binding ceiling from instances when firms tacitly collude at a nonbinding ceiling....

Incompatibility in markets with network effects can either benefit or harm consumers. Incompatibility reduces consumers’ ability to “mix and match” components offered by different sellers, but can also be associated with changes in product attributes that might benefit consumers. In this...

If consumers value 'mix and match' combinations of network complements, incompatibility between different sellers' components should affect prices. In ATM markets, a 1996 governance change exogenously generated such incompatibility, by allowing banks to impose surcharges when other banks'...