Riley (1979)'s reactive equilibrium concept addresses problems of equilibrium existence in competitive markets with adverse selection. The game-theoretic interpretation of the reactive equilibrium concept in Engers and Fernandez (1987) yields the Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976)/Riley (1979)...

We consider a model of cake-eating with private information. The model captures phenomena such as trust and "security of supply" in resource-use relationships. It also predicts supply shocks as an equilibrium phenomenon: privately informed sellers have incentives to reveal resource scarcity too...

The possibility of adverse selection by training firms is common theoretical argument for company-sponsored investments in general skills. The paper derives a public and a private signal after apprenticeship training and shows that training firms are able to positively select graduates they...

For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...