We propose a novel mechanism for coalitional policies in a climate coalition. In our proposed setup, national …

coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

coalition theory, we find that the potential benefits of water trade may not be sufficient to make all agents in the river …We analyse river sharing games in which a set of agents located along a river shares the available water. Using … cooperate and acknowledge property rights as a prerequisite for trade. Specifically, a complete market for river water may not …

Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and …

Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and …

theory in river basin management: People are reluctant to monetary transfers unrelated to water prices and game theoretic … Theorem. Both issues are discussed and applied to a bilateral version of the theoretical river basin model in Ambec and …

with respect to both emissions and membership. In that encompassing IEA game the size of the coalition is increasing in the … values, the grand coalition may or may not be attained if one of the moral parameter increases and tends towards one. …