In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction...

Der diesjährige Nobelpreis für Ökonomie ging an einen Wirtschaftswissenschaftler, der sich mit dem Wettbewerb auf Märkten und der Regulierung von Unternehmen befasst und dies solide - auch spieltheoretisch - fundiert. Jean Tirole hat allerdings ein sehr breites Forschungsspektrum, das Fragen...

Recent laboratory experiments have demonstrated that prioritizing registered donors on the waiting list impressively increases the willingness to register as an organ donor. In these experiments, registered organ recipients are prioritized regardless of howlong they have been on thewaiting list....

We analyze whether subjects with extensive laboratory experience and first-time participants, who voluntarily registered for the experiment, differ in their behavior. Subjects play four one-shot, two-player games: a trust game, a beauty contest, an ultimatum game, a travelers' dilemma and, in...

In asymmetric dilemma games without side payments, players face involved cooperation and bargaining problems. The maximization of joint profits is implausible, players disagree on the collusive action, and the outcome is often inefficient. For the example of a Cournot duopoly with asymmetric...

Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting list can substantially increase the number of donors and save lifes. Evidence for these effects comes from recent experiments that implemented such priority rules in abstract laboratory environments. In these experiments, participants who...

We analyse two team settings in which one member in a team has stronger incentives to contribute than the others. If contributions constitute a sacrifice for the strong player, the other team members are more inclined to cooperate than if contributions are strictly dominant for the strong player.

We use a public-good experiment to analyze behavior in a decentralized asymmetric punishment institution. The institution is asymmetric in the sense that players differ in the effectiveness of their punishment. At the aggregate level, we observe remarkable similarities between outcomes in...

This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It...

We analyze the Spence education game in experimental markets. We compare a signaling and a screening variant, and we analyze the effect of increasing the number of competing employers from two to three. In all treatments, more efficient workers invest more often in education and employers offer...