This paper examines the interplay between career concerns and market structure. Ability and effort are complements: effort increases the probability that a skilled agent achieves a one-time breakthrough. Wages are based on assessed ability and on expected output. Effort levels at different times...

We examine how developing an individual reputation for excellence affects a director's career outcomes in the labor market for boardroom talent. Using unique data on prestigious director awards, we find that individuals who experience very positive reputational shocks are typically rewarded with...

The current paper studies a multiple agent setting with career concerns and pay for performance contracts. In the two-period model, an Investor finances and offers a share of the profits to the Venture Capitalist. The Venture Capitalist, who faces career concerns, decides on the risk type of the...

We examine how real investment decisions of younger and older Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) are affected by their career concerns. Relative to their older counterparts, younger CEOs are more likely to enter new lines of business and exit from existing ones. They prefer growth through...