Bankruptcy risk induced by career concerns of regulators
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Cole, John A. ; Cadogan, Godfrey |
Published in: |
Finance research letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1544-6123, ZDB-ID 2181386-3. - Vol. 11.2014, 3, p. 259-271
|
Subject: | Career concerns | Revolving door | Managerial compensation | Bankruptcy | Value-at-risk | Human capital | Insolvenz | Insolvency | Erwerbsverlauf | Occupational attainment | Theorie | Theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Humankapital | Karriereplanung | Career development | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risikomaß | Risk measure | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risiko | Risk | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
-
Wan, Hualin, (2015)
-
Losers of CEO tournaments : incentives, turnover, and career outcomes
Chan, Eric W., (2022)
-
CEO tournament incentives and corporate debt contracting
Ghosh, Chinmoy, (2023)
- More ...
-
Bankruptcy risk induced by career concerns of regulators
Cole, John A., (2014)
-
A gravity model analysis of the benefits of economic integration in the Pacific Rim
Karemera, David, (2003)
-
Taxes and security design : a public finance rationale for tax differentiated corporate securities
Ang, James S., (1996)
- More ...