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Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2010

, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy … winning the election. -- spatial voting models ; electoral competition ; winning set ; interest groups …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003965090

Identification of voters with interest groups improves the electoral chances of the challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2009

, by coordinating voting behavior,these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379359

On the size of the winning set in the presence of interest groups

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2005

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore interest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343278

Politicians, Governed vs. Non-Governed Interest Groups and Rent Dissipation

Epstein, Gil S. - 2014

Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013061935

Identification of Voters with Interest Groups Improves the Electoral Chances of the Challenger

Sadiraj, Vjollca; Tuinstra, Jan; Van Winden, F. A. A. M. - 2021

, by coordinating voting behavior, these interest groups increase the winning set, which is defined as the set of policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316216

Investing in influence : how minority interests can prevail in a democracy

Skaperdas, Stergios; Vaidya, Samarth - 2021

How can the West's economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal forces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012649786

Reverse Revolving Doors : The Influence of Interest Groups on Legislative Voting

Alquezar-Yus, Miguel; Amer-Mestre, Josep - 2021

) influence the voting behavior of their colleague legislators. Using the alphabetic allocation of seats in the European … achieving a 44% reduction in voting abstention. Lobbyist legislators substantially increase the likelihood of their connections …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013242432

Committees and special interests

Felgenhauer, Mike; Grüner, Hans Peter - 2003

committees benefits from voting insincerely accrue not only when a decision maker's vote is pivotal. As the number of voters … increases, the cost of voting insincerely declines in an open committee because the probability of being pivotal declines. This … is not the case in a closed committee where costs and benefits of insincere voting only arise when a voter is pivotal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011604339

The Transitional Gains Trap

Carden, Art; Moore, Sarah - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013214193

Public Transport in Delhi - Tragedy of the Commons, Again!

Kathuria, Nimit - 2009

WHAT IS the most immediate tool of empowerment you can provide a person? Ask an economist. Or ask a laborer who has been moved to the outskirts of the city as a part of the quot;big-progressive resettlement schemequot;. Or ask a student. The most likely answer you will get is:...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718470