In this paper we analyze the optimal interplay between the publie and private enforceement of property rights. In doing so we endogenize the distinction between public and club goods on the one and private and common-pool goods on the other hand. The private enforcement of property rights is...

We provide a characterization of virtual Bayesian implementation in pure strategies for environments satisfying no-total-indifference. A social choice function in such environments is virtually Bayesian implementable if and only if it satisfies incentive compatibility and a condition we term...

Some polities are able to use constitutionally prescribed political processes to settle distributional disputes, whereas in other polities distributional disputes result in civil conflict. Theoretical analysis reveals that the following properties help to make it possible to design a...

In this short paper we provide two versions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. Both versions are extremely simple and allow a transparent understanding of Arrow’s theorem. The first version assumes a two-agent society; the second version, which is...

This paper provides a general overview of the literature on the core of an exchange economy with asymmetric information. Incentive compatibility is emphasized in studying core concepts at the ex ante and interim stage. The analysis includes issues of non-emptiness of the core as well as core...

In a differencial economy with quasi-linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfilment of incentive compability constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well-behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are...

We study the. Incentive effects of endogenous group formation in a voluntary contributon experiment. Subjects are given information on the past contributions of others and allowed to express a preference for partners. On the basis of the stated preferences new groups are formed. We find that the...

We present results from a novel experiment on the effect of a policy designed to encourage cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. We find that the effect of this policy on the level of cooperation is greater when it was chosen democratically by the subjects than when it was exogenously...