In this paper shortest path games are considered. The transportation of a good in a network has costs and benefit too. The problem is to divide the profit of the transportation among the players. Fragnelli et al (2000) introduce the class of shortest path games, which coincides with the class of...

We consider an analytic formulation/parametrization of the class of efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU games that, in contrast to previous approaches, which rely on the standard basis, rests on the linear representation of TU games by unanimity games. Unlike most of the other...

We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the efficiency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In this characterization, efficiency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615-621), i.e., whenever the total worth generated does not...

An extension of the Shapley value for games in partition function form is proposed in the paper. We introduce a version of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt the system of axioms provided by Shapley (A value for...

We study a one-period supply chain problem consisting of numerous suppliers delivering a homogenous good. Individual supply is uncertain and may exhibit dependencies with other suppliers as well as with the stochastic demand. Assuming that reliability of supply represents an economic value for...

The world's first multinational electricity market was formed with the creation of the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool. We analyze the incentives to undertake transmission network investment in the context of the liberalized Nordic electricity market. Welfare improving investment in a...

In standard coalition games, players try to form a coalition to secure a prize and a coalition agreement specifies how the prize is to be split among its members. However, in practical situations where coalitions are formed, the actual split of the prize often takes place after the coalition...

We model the process of coalition formation in the 16th German Bundestag as a hedonic coalition formation game. In order to induce players' preferences in the game we apply the Shapley value of the simple game describing all winning coalitions in the Bundestag. Using different stability notions...

The concept of fair representation of voters in a committee representing different voters' groups, such as national representations in union of states, is discussed. This concept, introduced into discussion about voting rights in the Council of European Union in 2004, was narrowed to proposal of...

The Shapley-Ichiishi result states that a game is convex if and only if the convex hull of marginal vectors equals the core. In this paper we generalize this result by distinguishing equivalence classes of balanced games that share the same core structure. We then associate a system of linear...