This paper proposes a two step procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement (auctions). First …, we estimate the (latent) cost for these bidders under both competition and collusion setups. Since, for the same bid the … recovered cost must be smaller under collusion- as collusion increases the mark-up- than under competition, detecting collusion …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of …