We analyze distributional preferences in games in which a decider chooses the provision of a good that benefits a receiver and creates costs for a group of payers. The average decider takes into account the welfare of all parties and has concerns for efficiency. However, she attaches similar...

We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of "unused...

We study a simple bargaining model in which the sender can make early offers to the receiver. Initially, the sender has private information about the value of the receiver’s outside option. The receiver learns this value before she chooses between the sender’s early offer and her outside...

Do news outlets push overly positive or negative attitudes to migration in their coverage, or do they try to maintain a neutral and holistic perspective on the topic? To study media slant in the context of migration, we collect and code migration-related pictures that news outlets publish and -...

Do news outlets push overly positive or negative attitudes to migration in their coverage, or do they try to maintain a neutral and holistic perspective on the topic? To study media slant in the context of migration, we collect and code migration-related pictures that news outlets publish and -...