This paper considers the incentives for risk-averse firms to share their private information. They show that the introduction of risk aversion in some cases reverses the result in the literature that no such incentives exist. Further, they show that the output level of risk-averse Cournot...

This paper provides evidence of the incidence and variety of low-price guarantees (promises to match or beat a rival's price) using data obtained from newspaper advertisements in 37 metropolitan areas in the United States. We have a total of 515 low-price guarantees in our sample. We document...

In imperfectly competitive markets, incentives for the acquisition and dissemination of information by prices is significantly affected by strategic considerations. Since prices reveal information, firms possessing market power may choose to set prices that are either biased or not adjusted to...

We provide evidence of the widespread use and variety of low-price guarantees (how common are they; on what products and services are they observed; and what forms do they take), using data obtained from newspaper advertisements in thirty-seven metropolitan areas in the United States. We also...

We investigate whether increased transparency about prices may increase the countervailing power exercised by buyers of an intermediate good and whether this will lead to a decrease of intermediate goods prices. We show that, even in a non-cooperative, one-shot model, the most likely outcome of...

This paper analyzes the effect of demand uncertainty in a two-stage duopoly model where firms first choose capacity then price, and shows that the equilibrium is sensitive to the decision structure of the model. If both the capacity choice and the price choice are made simultaneously, no pure...

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often,...

Imperfectly competitive product markets cannot be informationally efficient as private information has strategic implications interfering with price adjustment. This is illustrated in a duopoly model with sequential price setting where private information either leads to prices not being...

In this paper, a domestic and a foreign firm compete as Cournot duopolists in the domestic market. The foreign firm has incomplete information about the costs of the domestic firm, but the domestic government and the domestic firm are completely informed. It is shown that the domestic government...

In a Cournot duopoly model of international competition between a domestic and foreign firm, it is shown that when the foreign firm has incomplete information about the marginal cost of the domestic firm then the domestic government can use an export subsidy to signal the competitiveness of its...