Applying the non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, I examine a widely held view in economic literature that … an efficient outcome can be agreed on in voluntary bargaining among rational agents in the absence of transaction costs …

This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the … following additional ingredients: (i) There is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) Prior to the deadline … timing in which players make demands. This is important, as multilateral bargaining models are sometimes too sensitive to …

be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient …

The Nash bargaining solution of a modified bargaining problem in the contract space yields the pair of stationary … vanishes, convergence to the Nash bargaining solution is immediate by the Maximum Theorem. Numerical implementation in standard …

Despite extensive use of bargaining models in economics and despite Becker's insistence on the importance of altruism … in families, the theoretical literature on bargaining ignores altruism and assumes that everyone is an egoist. This paper … shows that incorporating altruism into cooperative bargaining models shrinks the set potential cooperative bargaining …

Despite recent advances, no general methods for computing bargaining power in non-cooperative games exist. We propose a … applications to cartel formation, the non-cooperative model of the household, and legislative bargaining. …

be singular. Strategy profiles excluding perpetual disagreement guarantee non-singularity. The necessary and sufficient …

We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a … seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or delegate bargaining to an intermediary. The … renegotiation prevents a full elination of the commitment effect of delegation. Indeed, there are always gains from delegation when …

This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the … following additional ingredients: (i) There is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) Prior to the deadline … timing in which players make demands. This is important, as multilateral bargaining models are sometimes too sensitive to …