The direct sale of emissions allowances by auction is an emerging characteristic of cap-and-trade programs. This study … setting to investigate the effects of a loose cap environment on a variety of auction types. We find all auction formats … studied are efficient in allocating emissions allowances, but auction revenues tend to be lower relative to competitive …

In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability …. However, experimental and empirical evidence suggests that agent's expectations depend on direct utility stemming from … expectations, resulting in optimism or pessimism. Optimism increases ex ante savoring, while pessimism leads to less disappointment …

We examine bidding behaviour of individuals and teams in an experimental auction resembling UMTS-license auctions. Even … relied on individual bidders. Our results show that teams stay on average longer in an (ascending sealed-bid English) auction … winner's curse. The auction's efficiency is nevertheless higher with teams, since the bidders with the highest valuation are …

In the variable supply auction considered here, the seller decides how many costumers with unit demand to serve after … discriminatory price auction is better for the seller in this setting. Exactly as predicted by theory, it turns out that the uniform … price auction produces substantially higher bids, and consequently yields higher revenues and profits for the seller …

We experimentally examine the effectiveness of antitrust policies against bidding rings in theEnglish auction (EN) and … the first-price sealed-bid auction (FP). We consider both traditionalantitrust policy (without a leniency program) and …

We experimentally examine the collusive properties of two commonly used auctions: the English auction (EN) and the … first-price sealed-bid auction (FPSB). In theory, both tacit and overt collusion are always incentive compatible in EN while … both can be incentive compatible in FPSB if the auction is repeated and bidders are patient enough. We find that the …

We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first …