Platform-run marketplaces may exploit third-party sellers' data to develop competing products, but potential for future competition can deter sellers' enrty. We explore how this trade-off affects the platform's referral fee and its own entry decision. We first characterize the platform's optimal...

This paper considers the problem of second-degree price discrimination when the type distribution is unknown or imperfectly specified by means of an ambiguity set. As robustness measure we use a performance index, equivalent to relative regret, which quantifies the worst-case attainment ratio...

This paper develops a theory of optimal provision of commitment devices to people who value both commitment and flexibility, and whose preferences differ in the degree of time inconsistency. If time inconsistency is observable, both a planner and a monopolist provide devices that help each...

We address the issue of risk aversion in a competitive equilibrium when some buyers engage in learning and information is conveyed through the price system. Specifically, since the learning process yields uncertainty, we study the effect of risk aversion on the equilibrium outcomes of the model,...

Many platforms operating online marketplaces sell their own products alongside those of third-party sellers, and may use marketplace data on the demand for third-party products to inform the launch of their own products. To evaluate the anti-competitive implications of this practice, we model...

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers’ preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist’s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer’s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume...

We present a model of price discrimination where a monopolist faces a consumer who is privately informed about the distribution of his valuation for an indivisible unit of good but has yet to learn privately the actual valuation. The monopolist sequentially screens the consumer with a menu of...

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelation of information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is based on the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships. Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose...

A tanulmányban az optimális piacformák avagy "árverések" elméletének egyes kérdéseivel foglalkozunk. Célunk az, hogy az Olvasó áttekintést nyerjen a terület legfontosabb - megoldott és megoldatlan - problémáiról, illetve az asszimmetrikus információ mikroökonómiai...

We study the effects of exclusive contracts and market-share discounts (i.e., discounts conditioned on the share a firm receives of the customer’s total purchases) in an adverse selection model where firms supply differentiated products and compete in non-linear prices. We show that exclusive...