We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders' sensibility for the signaling concern is …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

seller's information is not verifiable, and the reserve price works as a signaling device. In this paper, we consider an … that such a signaling incentive could decrease the seller's profit and probability of sale in equilibrium, with a larger …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be … beneficial for any precision of the signal. -- Asymmetric auction ; first-price auction ; signaling …

We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer … clock, affects signaling incentives differently in both auction formats, and thereby also the bidders’ incentives to overbid …

-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be …