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Political Competition and Mirrleesian Income Taxation: A First Pass

Bierbrauer, Felix J.; Boyer, Pierre C. - CESifo - 2010

We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may differ in competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician’s policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents, whereas those of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008833892

Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass

Bierbrauer, Felix; Boyer, Pierre C. - Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung von … - 2010

We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may differ in competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician's policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents, whereas those of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008742969

Electoral Campaign Financing: The Role of Public Contributions and Party Ideology

Portuga, Adriana Cuocco; Bugarin, Mauricio - In: ECONOMIA JOURNAL OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN … (2007)

This article analyzes the effects of public financing of electoral campaigns on policies announced by ideologically oriented parties, subject to pre-electoral lobbying. Parties´ ideologies make politicians announce divergent platforms, even though it means losing some votes. Divergent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009021280

Political competition and Mirrleesian income taxation: A first pass

Bierbrauer, F.J.; Boyer, F.J. - Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge - 2011

We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may dier in competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician's policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents, whereas those of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009024904

Partially Binding Platforms: Political Promises as a Partial Commitment Device

Asako, Yasushi - Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan - 2010

This paper examines the effects of campaign platforms in political competition when campaign platforms are partially binding: a candidate who implements a policy different from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal that increases with the size of the discrepancy. With partially binding...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472561

Political motivations and electoral competition : equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence

Drouvelis, Michalis; Saporiti, Alejandro; Vriend, … - 2013

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198494

Centrist's Curse? An Electoral Competition Model with Credibility Constraints

Ergun, Selim - Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Facultad … - 2008

I analyze a model of electoral competition in which a candidate?s reputation and his need of cred- ibility restricts … credibility constraints. I show that centrist parties are disadvantaged compared to leftist and rightist ones, since, in … the centrist parties?ideology set. A centrist candidate needs a higher concentration of voters in his credibility set …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005590844

Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage

Manzoni, Elena; Penczynski, Stefan P. - 2014

's effective ability; however, the distortions may be increasing in the incumbent's reputation of expertise on his signature issue. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011441860

Last minute policies and the incumbency advantage

Manzoni, Elena; Penczynski, Stefan P. - 2012

This paper models a purely informational mechanism behind the incumbency advantage. In a two-period electoral campaign with two policy issues, a specialized incumbent and an unspecialized, but possibly more competent challenger compete for election by voters who are heterogeneously informed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281797

Populism

Frisell, Lars - Sveriges Riksbank - 2004

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but just try to outguess popular opinion. Although rational voters see through such populism, candidates can not resist resorting to it when the spoils of office are too large. For an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005423745