This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well …. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium … victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most …

This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well …. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium … victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most …

This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well …. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium … victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most …

This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three contestants, where the contestants know each other well …. Every contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage specifically against his most dangerous rival. In equilibrium … victims of mobbing are sometimes found to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalizes promotion chances. The effect is most …

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning … contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior … systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is …

In a contest players compete for winning a prize by effort and thereby increasing their probability of winning … contests with heterogeneous agents who may individually sabotage each other. Our results suggest that sabotaging behavior … systematically varies with the composition of different types of agents in a contest. Moreover, if the saboteur's identity is …

selection efficiency of such contests is examined. We show that the selection efficiency of a contest may be improved by …We study selection contests in which the strategic variable is degree of risk rather than amount of effort. The … results may contribute to our understanding of such diverse phenomena as promotion processes in firms, selection of fund …

This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage … the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to implement the first-best effort, and then offer two distinct … incentive schemes, fast track and late selection, to circumvent this problem. The present model offers a mechanism through which …

Tournament incentive schemes offer payments dependent on relative performance and thereby are intended to motivate … competitors in order to improve the own relative position. In the present study we investigate whether this sabotage problem is … mitigated in a repeated interaction between the agents and the principal. As sabotage can hardly be observed in real …

the presence of tournament incentives, agents react reciprocally to higher wages, which mitigates the sabotage problem …Although relative performance schemes are pervasive in organizations reliable empirical data on induced sabotage … behavior is almost non-existent. We study sabotage in tournaments in a controlled laboratory experiment and are able to confirm …