We show the role of unmediated talk with computational complexity bounds as both an information transmission and a coordination device for the class of two-player games with incomplete information and rational parameters. We prove that any communication equilibrium payoff of such games can be...

The main contribution of this paper is the development and application of cryptographic techniques to the design of strategic communication mechanisms. One of the main assumptions in cryptography is the limitation of the computational power available to agents. We introduce the concept of...

We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The...

This paper constructs the equilibrium for a specific code that can be seen as a “universal grammar” in a class of common interest Sender–Receiver games where players communicate through a noisy channel. We propose a Senderʼs signaling strategy which does not depend on either the game...

Statistical information is crucial for managerial decision making. The decision-making literature in psychology and mathematical cognition documents how different statistical formats can facilitate certain types of decisions. The present analysis is the first of its kind to assess the impact of...

This paper is a note on how Information Theory and Codification Theory are helpful in the computational design of both communication protocols and strategy sets in the framework of finitely repeated games played by bounded rational agents. More precisely, we show the usefulness of both theories...

We examine a monopoly facing an uncertain demand and maximizing profits over a two-period horizon. Conditions are developed under which the firm will find it optimal to "experiment," or adjust initial prices or quantities away from their myopically optimal level in order to increase the...

Action-Set games are transferable utility games where the set of players is finite, every player has a finite set of actions, and the worth of the game is a function of the actions taken by the players. In this setting a rule has to determine individual payoffs at each combinations of actions....