We develop a framework in which individuals' preferences coevolve with their abilities to deceive others about their preferences and intentions. Specifically, individuals are characterised by (i) a level of cognitive sophistication and (ii) a subjective utility function. Increased cognition is...

We present complete results pertaining to the dynamical stability for sender-receiver games following Lewis (1969), and Nowak and Krakauer (1999) under the selection-mutation dynamics. Our research reveals that two distinct classes of neutrally stable strategies have a distinguishing feature of...

In this article, we propose a Snowdrift Game with costly punishment in a spatial-structured two-population arrangement. In order to generate the results, we use the Agent Based Simulation (ABS) model. The numerical simulations as well as the dynamics observed in the ABS are analyzed and...

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg, Hofbauer, and Kuzmics (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of...

We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it has (1) a product structure, is (2) upper semi-continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and is (4) convex- and closed-valued. For each...

In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) pointed out that only the Cournot outcome, but not the Stackelberg outcome, can be supported by a pure Nash equilibrium when actions of the Stackelberg leader are observed with the slightest error. The Stackelberg outcome, however, remains close to the outcome of...

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule 'imitate-if-better' can hardly be beaten by any strategy. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable in the sense that there is no strategy that can exploit imitation as a...

Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding “mass-action” equilibrium. We show that...

We prove that any deterministic evolutionary dynamic satisfying four mild requirements fails to eliminate strictly dominated strategies in some games. We also show that existing elimination results for evolutionary dynamics are not robust to small changes in the specifications of the dynamics....

A population of agents recurrently plays a two-strategy population game. When an agent receives a revision opportunity, he chooses a new strategy using a noisy best response rule that satisfies mild regularity conditions; best response with mutations, logit choice, and probit choice are all...