axiomatization of the Shapley value that the requirements of Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity are …

, it is shown that a decreasing unit price function is a sufficient condition for a non-empty core: the Direct Price … solution is both a core element and a marginal vector. It is seen that the nucleolus of an MCP-game can be derived in …

interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions are introduced and …

costs such that each agent demands consecutive sections. We show that the core, the prenucleolus, and the Shapley value on … associated games do not occur. The main axioms for the core and the nucleolus are consistency properties based on the reduced …

-building set. Properties of this solution are also studied. To establish core stability we introduce appropriate convexity …

Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core of cooperative games with … transferable utility. We first characterize balanced games, i.e., the set of games with a nonempty core, through geometric … nonnegative linear combination of some simple games. Moreover, we show that the set of games whose Shapley value lies in the core …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …