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2-coordination games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334690
common questions raised in the literature on refinements of Nash equlibrium. -- evolutionary games ; cheap talk ; stability …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009697463
Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies. -- replicator dynamics ; evolutionary stability ; continuous strategy spaces …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578001
applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, linear-quadratic games, the harvest preemption game, and games with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014141793
Whoever exists belongs to a species, which did not become extinct, has a (geno-)type, which should be well adjusted, and lives in a habitat which has been sustainable for a long time. We do not only analyze interspecies competition and the conditions for species survival, but also intraspecies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014149382
Until recently, theorists considering the evolution of human cooperation have paid little attention to institutional punishment, a defining feature of large-scale human societies. Compared to individually-administered punishment, institutional punishment offers a unique potential advantage: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316651
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand <i>why</i> an evolutionary process might optimally lead to such seemingly dysfunctional features...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704445
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive population dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here model mutation rates as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334682
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be unambiguously interpreted … in two classes of games. First, in mono-tonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation … class of games. Second, we examine a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with costly signaling, where standard …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273822
cooperation by Markov perfect strategies in situations which are usually modelled as repeated prisoners' dilemma games. The idea … corresponding dynamic games are discussed for the trigger strategy and for a strategy which is weakly renegotiation-proof. Finally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275348