We study the impact of countries' subjective beliefs, i.e., pessimism and optimism, on international agreements to provide global public goods. Under linear payoffs, we find that while pessimism could decrease signatories' efforts, it can also increase the coalition size. Optimism yields the...

We investigate the implications of consumer nationalism for multilateral trade cooperation. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that countries with relatively more nationalist consumers can sustain relatively more liberal trade policies in a repeated-game setting. Moreover, the most cooperative...

We introduce hierarchical decision-making in a repeated public goods experiment where representatives decide on contributions and punishment not only on their behalf, but also on behalf of their team members. We confirm the established finding that punishment reverses the slide towards the zero...

We introduce hierarchical decision-making in a repeated public goods experiment where representatives decide on contributions and punishment not only on their behalf, but also on behalf of their team members. We confirm the established finding that punishment reverses the slide towards the zero...