We study joint marketing arrangements by competing firms who engage in price discrimination between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasing) and those who purchase from both competitors (bundle purchasers). Two types of joint marketing are considered. Firms either commit to a...

We study joint marketing arrangements by competing firms who engage in price discrimination between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasing) and those who purchase from both competitors (bundle purchasers). Two types of joint marketing are considered. Firms either commit to a...

We study joint marketing arrangements by competing firms who engage in price discrimination between consumers who patronize only one firm (single purchasing) and those who purchase from both competitors (bundle purchasers). Two types of joint marketing are considered. Firms either commit to a...

We examine the problem of designing performance contracts with multiple agents when principals must compete for quality teams from a heterogeneous pool of agents. The trade-off principals face between good recruiting and good team performance provides micro foundations for agents to form stable...

I develop a simple Hotelling model which relates the distribution of consumer preferences to the intensity of competition. I impose two properties, mean preserving spread (MPS) and monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), on distribution functions. These properties provide a way to represent...

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts, and...