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centralization and delegation, and (iii) two-way communication with an informed principal …
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Misrepresenting private information is often costly. This paper studies a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982)(CS), but with a signaling dimension where there is a convex cost of misreporting. I identify a simple condition, called No Incentive to...
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simple logic by which the receiver's prior knowledge becomes an impediment to efficient communication. We show that the … extent of communication is severely limited as the receiver becomes more informed. Moreover, in a simple example with two …
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I study a persuasion game between a privately informed agent and a decision maker (DM) who can imperfectly verify the statements made by the agent by observing a signal that is correlated with the agent's information. I find that whether or not the DM benefits from communicating with the agent...
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study by Morris argued that analysts' (experts') reputational concerns may discourage truthful communication when they try … on communication in a setting where analysts can choose their precision endogenously. Because both misaligned and aligned … analysts want investors to trust their reports in the future, both will aim to build a reputation for being aligned. In …
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