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This note showed by means of Knuths example that some stable matchings may not be obtained by the random order mechanism.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753166
This paper studies an exchange economy with indivisibilities. Our main goal is to see if a price system can function well in an economy (e.g., an economy with complementary preferences) that does not have a Walrasian equilibrium. We study the price adjustment processes governed by the Euler...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005800334
This paper studies a production economy with indivisibilities. We provide a characterization for all Walraian equilibria and a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Walrasian equilibrium. We find a sufficient condition for every descening (ascending) price process to converge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005800393
This paper studies the English (progressive) auction for an exchange economy with multiple objects. The English auction is a tatonnement process and lasts multiple rounds. It is modeled as a sequence of round games. Each round game is a normal form game in which an agent's strategies are his...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839046
This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agent is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the core equivalence theorem may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839071
The U.S. economy had experienced the "jobless recovering" after the 1990-1991 and 2001 recessions, which has been constantly puzzling the economists, market analysts, and policymakers. This paper uses a simple hiring game in an efficiency wage model framework to resolve that puzzle. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839077
Roth and Vande Vate (1991) studied the marriage problem and introduced the notion of truncation strategies and showed in an example that the unstable matchings can arise at Nash equilibria in truncations. This paper studies the college admissions problem and shows that all rematching proof or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005839080
We show that in the marriage problem the student-optimal algorithm may in fact generate an equilibrium outcome that is college-optimal and student-pessimal in terms of the true preferences even though it is student-optimal and college-pessimal in terms of the submitted preferences. In the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008495008
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