Showing 1 - 10 of 38,613
This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395148
This paper studies collusion in one-shot auctions, where a buyer can bribe his competitors into lowering their bids. We modify the single-unit Vickrey auction to incite deviations from the designated-winner scenario and thus undermine collusion. The construction of mechanism does not require the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010891239
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333924
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010373498
The authors consider theoretical models for mechanisms of the wholesale electricity market. Among them: Cournot auction, first-price auction of supply functions, Vickrey auction, pay-as-bid auction, two-stage auction. Theoretical estimations of their short-term efficiency from social welfare...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839447
We introduce a subsidized Vickrey auction for cost sharing problems. Although the average, marginal, and serial cost sharing mechanisms are budget-balanced, they are not allocatively efficient and they do not induce players to truthfully reveal their values as a dominant strategy. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005595928
This paper completely characterizes the set of Nash equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785928
We consider situations where a society tries to efficiently allocate several homogeneous and indivisible goods among agents. Each agent receives at most one unit of the good. For example, suppose that a government wishes to allocate a fixed number of licenses to operate in its country to private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332345
We investigate Groves mechanisms for economies where (i) a social outcome specifies a group of winning agents, and (ii) a cost function associates each group with a monetary cost. In particular, we characterize both (i) the class of cost functions for which there are Groves mechanisms such that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536965
This study explores two key factors influencing subjects' deviation from domi- nant bidding in Vickrey auction experiments. The first factor examines subjects' understanding of strategy-proofness (SP), while the second focuses on "human interaction" which includes social preferences (spite and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540475