This article provides an analysis and critique of tax penalties affecting employers and individuals in the Affordable Care Act. After an overview of the Act and its intended role in addressing problems in the health insurance system, the article turns to examine the employer and individual...

Although physicians are often expected to be gatekeepers to health insurance benefits such as paid sick leave, research indicates a substantial reluctance to reject patient requests for sickness certificates. We show that private information on the patient's part creates a conflict between the...

In public health sectors of many developing countries, patients offer payments to their doctors outside the official payment channels. We argue that the fundamental cause of informal payments is that formal prices cannot fully differentiate patients' various needs. We compare welfare...

We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times; and (iii) hospitals incur waiting time penalties. We show that, whereas policies based on penalties will lead to lower...

We study whether and how physicians respond to financial incentives, making use of detailed register data on the health-care services provided to patients by general practitioners (GPs) in Norway over a six-year period (2006-11). To identify GPs' treatment responses, we exploit that...

Our analysis of the financial data of selected Queensland not-for-profit organisations for the financial years 2019, 2020 and 2021 show that Queensland’s not-for-profit sector is likely suffering from significant financial pressure. This pressure is a result of increasing costs of inputs - 19%...

Cost Utility Analysis (CUA) and Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) are methods to evaluate allocations of health care resources. Problems are raised for both methods when income taxes do not meet the first best optimum. This paper explores the implications of three ways that taxes may fall short of...

Suppliers who are better informed than purchasers, such as physicians treating insured patients, often have discretion over what to provide. This paper shows how, when the purchaser observes what is supplied but can observe neither recipient type nor the actual cost incurred, optimal provision...

Although physicians are often expected to be gatekeepers to health insurance benefits such as paid sick leave, research indicates a substantial reluctance to reject patient requests for sickness certificates. We show that private information on the patient's part creates a conflict between the...

We develop a dynamic model of hospital competition where (i) waiting times increase if demand exceeds supply; (ii) patients choose a hospital based in part on waiting times; and (iii) hospitals incur waiting time penalties. We show that, whereas policies based on penalties will lead to lower...