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Potential maximization and coalition government formation

Garratt, Rod; Parco, James E.; Qin, Cheng-zhong; … - In: International game theory review 7 (2005) 4, pp. 407-429

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003280350

The breakdown of cooperation in iterative real-time trust dilemmas

Murphy, Ryan O.; Rapoport, Amnon; Parco, James E. - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 9 (2006) 2, pp. 147-166

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Resistance to truthful revelation in bargaining : persistent bid shading and the play of dominated strategies

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Equilibrium play in single-server queues with endogenously determined arrival times

Rapoport, Amnon; Stein, William E.; Parco, James E.; … - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 55 (2004) 1, pp. 67-91

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Joining a queue or staying out : effects of information structure and service time on arrival and staying out decisions

Seale, Darryl A.; Parco, James E.; Stein, William E.; … - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 8 (2005) 2, pp. 117-144

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002949265

Potential maximization and coalition government formation

Garratt, Rod; Parco, James E.; Qin, Cheng-zhong; … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002343568

Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game

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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001759628

Coordination in the aggregate without common knowledge or outcome information

Rapoport, Amnon; Seale, Darryl A.; Parco, James E. - In: Experimental business research, (pp. 69-99). 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009126155

Potential maximization and coalition government formation

Garratt, Rod; Parco, James E.; Qin, Cheng-zhong; … - 2004

A model of coalition government formation is presented in which inefficient, non-minimal winning coalitions may form in Nash equilibrium. Predictions for five games are presented and tested experimentally. The experimental data support potential maximization as a refinement of Nash equilibrium....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603116

Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation

Garratt, Rod; Qin, Cheng-Zhong; Parco, James E.; … - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324956