This paper surveys 4 major capital structure theories: trade-off, pecking order, signaling and market timing. For each theory, a basic model and its major implications are presented. These implications are compared to the available evidence. This is followed by an overview of pros and cons for...

We add quality uncertainty to a two-country trade model with CES preference and monopolistic competition. There are two kinds of firms - low quality and high quality. Quality is perfectly observable in the domestic market but not in the foreign market. Exporters use price to signal their...

After controlling a variety of feeder cattle characteristics and market and sale conditions in Iowa feeder auctions, the price premiums for preconditioning claims (vaccinations and minimum 30 days of weaning) with and without third-party certification (TPC) are estimated as $6.12/cwt and...

We study the interdependence of optimal tax and expenditure policies. An optimal policy requires that information on preferences is made available. We first study this problem from a general mechanism design perspective and show that efficiency is possible only if the individuals who decide on...

We study the role of whistleblowing in the following inspection game. Two agents who compete for a prize can either behave legally or illegally. After the competition, a controller investigates the agents’ behavior. This inspection game has a unique (Bayesian) equilibrium in mixed strategies....

This paper shows how public debt repurchases can be used to reduce the costs of debt service under the hypothesis that the government could be of two types and that there is asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. For example, at the beginning of a fiscal...