We study a psychologically based foundation for choice errors. The decision maker applies a preference ranking after forming a 'consideration set' prior to choosing an alternative. Membership of the consideration set is determined both by the alternative specific salience and by the rationality...

We model the choice behaviour of an agent who suffers from imperfect attention but is otherwise von Neumann Morgenstern rational. We define inattention axiomatically through preference over menus and endowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with an alternative...

We model the choice behaviour of an agent who suffers from imperfect attention. We define inattention axiomatically through preference over menus and endowed alternatives: an agent is inattentive if it is better to be endowed with an alternative a than to be allowed to pick a from a menu in...

We introduce attention games. Alternatives ranked by quality (producers, politicians, sexual partners...) desire to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by investing in their own salience. We prove that if alternatives can control the attention they get, then ”the...

Classical definitions of complementarity are based on cross price elasticities, and so they do not apply, for example, when goods are free. This context includes many relevant cases such as online newspapers and public attractions. We look for a complementarity notion that does not rely on price...

There are many situations in which alternatives ranked by quality wish to be chosen and compete for the imperfect attention of a chooser by selecting their own salience. The chooser may be "tricked" into choosing more salient but inferior alternatives. We investigate when competitive forces...

We propose a novel method to model an agent who is imperfectly attentive in the sense that she may consider only some of the alternatives available. Our methodology departs from the standard 'revealed preference' one: we make plausible assumptions on the values to the imperfectly attentive agent...

In Tversky's (1969) model of a lexicographic semiorder, preference is generated by the sequential application of numerical criteria, by declaring an alternative x better than an alternative y if the first criterion that distinguishes between x and y ranks x higher than y by an amount exceeding a...

We study two-stage choice procedures in which the decision maker first preselects the alternatives whose values according to a criterion pass a menu-dependent threshold, and then maximizes a second criterion to narrow the selection further. This framework overlaps with several existing models...

We model club formation as a non-cooperative game of coalition formation and surplus division. We show how social norms and individual rationality sustain a particular form of collective inefficiency, namely excessive entry in the joint production and exploitation of an excludable good. We term...