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In memoriam Bezalel Peleg (1936-2019)
Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 48 (2019) 2, pp. 363
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012062027
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On Bayesian-Nash equilibria satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem : the dependent case
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936843
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Condorcet jury theorem : the dependent case
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - 2008
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003686116
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Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: Social choice and welfare 39 (2012) 1, pp. 91-125
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009550743
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Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 57 (2014) 2, pp. 279-302
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010436230
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Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - 2013
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009779267
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Judgments aggregation by a sequential majority procedure
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shemuʾel - In: Mathematical social sciences 95 (2018), pp. 37-46
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012130812
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Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shmuel - In: Economic Theory 57 (2014) 2, pp. 279-302
We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizens are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i.e., functions that map profiles of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010949492
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Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shmuel - Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University … - 2013
We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizen are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i. e., functions that map profiles of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010839557
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Extending the Condorcet Jury Theorem to a general dependent jury
Peleg, Bezalel; Zamir, Shmuel - In: Social choice and welfare 39 (2012) 1, pp. 91-126
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009978141