We show that institutional shareholders of acquiring companies on average do not lose money around public merger announcements, because they also hold substantial stakes in the targets and make up for the losses from the former with the gains from the latter. Depending on their holdings in the...

Corporate spin-offs create new firms with characteristics markedly different from the original firm. Consequently, institutional investors pre-committed to certain investment styles and/or subject to fiduciary restrictions have incentives to rebalance their portfolios at the time of the...

Because spin-offs create new firms with characteristics markedly different from the original firm, institutional investors pre-committed to certain investment styles and/or subject to fiduciary restrictions have incentives to rebalance their portfolios at the time of the spin-off. Prior articles...

We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees....

In the standard principal/agent model, CEO compensation, together with the CEO's unobservable actions and abilities, determines firm performance. We develop an alternative perspective: unobservable firm characteristics, through their effect on firm value and the CEO's utility, determine...

We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets. We show that varying the liquidity and opacity of corporate assets, the vitality of the market for corporate control, and the costs of enforcing shareholder rights to cash flows...

We model corporate governance in a world with competitive securities markets as well as markets for corporate assets. We show that varying the liquidity and opacity of corporate assets, the vitality of the market for corporate control, and the costs of enforcing shareholder rights to cash flows...

We examine situations where the same fund manager simultaneously manages mutual funds and hedge funds. We refer to this as side-by-side management. We document 294 such cases involving 694 mutual funds and 538 hedge funds. Proponents of this practice argue that it is essential to hire and retain...

This paper provides evidence on the impact of different types of institutional investors on a firm's thrust to compete. A firm's thrust to compete, as an attribute of corporate culture, captures the relative importance of corporate values that push a firm to achieve shareholder value in the...

This paper examines whether the systemic risk of financial institutions is associated with the risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation. We measure managerial risk-taking incentives with the sensitivities of chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO)...