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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011106753
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011390055
According to the so-called Exclusion Principle (introduced by Baye et alii, 1993), it might be profitable for the seller to reduce the number of (fullyinformed) potential bidders in an all-pay auction. We show that the Exclusion Principle does not apply if the seller regards the bidders' private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326123
This paper analyzes an all-pay auction where the winner is determined according to the sum of the bid and a handicap endowed to all players. The bidding strategy in equilibrium is then explicitly derived as a 'piecewise affine transformation' of the equilibrium strategy in an all-pay auction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332270
We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333743
We study all-pay auctions (or wars of attrition), where the highest bidder wins an object, but all bidders pay their bids. We consider such auctions when two bidders alternate in raising their bids and where all aspects of the auction are common knowledge including bidders.valuations. We analyze...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266326
We study cheap-talk pre-play communication in the static all-pay auctions. For the case of two bidders, all correlated and communication equilibria are payoff equivalent to the Nash equilibrium if there is no reserve price, or if it is commonly known that one bidder has a strictly higher value....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009745257
We study an elimination tournament with heterogenous contestants whose ability is common-knowledge. Each pair-wise match is modeled as an all-pay auction where the winner gets the right to compete at the next round. Equilibrium efforts are in mixed strategies, yielding rather complex play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343975
We characterize the optimal structure of prizes in contests, when the contest designer is interested in the maximization of either the expected total e¢çort or the expected highest e¢çort. The all-pay auction framework in the present paper makes it possible to derive all the results in Benny...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010856714
We study a sequential two-stage all-pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player may win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727312