We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since...

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since...

The authors study credible information transmission by a benevolent central bank. They consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different...

We study credible information transmission by a benevolent Central Bank. We consider two possibilities: direct revelation through an announcement, versus indirect information transmission through monetary policy. These two ways of transmitting information have very different consequences. Since...

We study the nature of monetary policy in a model where uncertainty can lead to a discrepancy between economic agents' beliefs and true fundamentals. Monetary policy transmits information about fundamentals. The public nature of this information can help agents to coordinate their decisions....

Emissions trading mechanisms have been proposed, and in some cases implemented, as a tool to reduce pollution. We explore the similarities between emission-trading mechanisms and monetary mechanisms. Both attempt to implement desirable allocations under various frictions, including risk and...

We investigate the role of settlement in a dynamic model of a payment system where the ability of participants to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. In the absence of settlement, the full information first-best allocation cannot be...